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Approximating Nash Equilibria in
Tree Polymatrix Games
Siddharth Barman∗ Katrina Ligett† Georgios Piliouras‡
Abstract
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilib-
ria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in par-
ticular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximateNash equi-
libria of tree polymatrix games in which the number of actions per player is a fixed constant.
Further, for trees with constant degree, the running time of the algorithm matches the best
known upper bound for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games (Lipton, Markakis,
and Mehta 2003).
Notably, this work closely complements the hardness result of Rubinstein (2015), which
establishes the inapproximability of Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over constant-degree
bipartite graphs with two actions per player.
1 Introduction
The complexity of equilibrium computation is a central area of research in algorithmic game
theory. Recent years have seen significant progress in this line of work, especially in the context
of two-player games [3–7,13,16,17]. Furthermore, the computation of approximate Nash equi-
librium in games over networks has emerged as an important research direction [2,8,10,12,15].
Motivation for studying such multiplayer games stems in part from the prevalence and impor-
tance of large networks of interconnected, self-interested agents.
The prototypical family of large network games is that of polymatrix games. These games
merge two classical concepts, two-player games and networks. In a polymatrix game, each
player corresponds to a node in a network, and each edge encodes a two-player game between
the two endpoints of the edge. A player’s payoff is the sum of her payoffs across the bimatrix
games (edges) she participates in. Polymatrix games capture complex settings with arbitrarily
many players while keeping the description complexity of the game polynomially small in the
number of players. Computation of equilibria for polymatrix games is hence a natural test
case, and has emerged at the boundary of computational tractability.
The seminal PPAD hardness reductions for computing ε-Nash equilibria1 by Daskalakis,
Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [5] along with their extensions by Chen, Deng, and Teng [3] to
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1In an ε-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most ε by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy.
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two-player games were crucially developedwithin the context of polymatrix games.2 Recently,
Rubinstein [16] strengthened these inapproximability guarantees by establishing that there ex-
ists a constant ε such that finding an ε-Nash equilibrium in polymatrix games over bipartite
graphs of constant degree is computationally hard. Our positive algorithmic result is inspired
by this work and explores the boundary between tractability and intractability of ε-Nash computation
in polymatrix games.
The study of equilibria in polymatrix games has had a long history [11, 18]. To avoid hard-
ness, most algorithmic results have focused on structured subclasses of polymatrix games.
These include polymatrix generalizations of zero-sum games where exact Nash equilibria can
be computed in polynomial time [2, 8]. Games on trees is another family of multiplayer games
that has received attention [10,12,15]. The proposed algorithm in [10] finds an exact Nash equi-
librium in two-action games on paths and runs in polynomial time, but in the case of trees the
running time may be exponential even if the degree of the underlying tree is bounded. In con-
trast, we study computation of approximate Nash equilibrium in trees of arbitrary degree, and
develop an algorithm that runs in quasi-polynomial time. Finally, some interesting progress
has been made in the case of general polymatrix games as well, where it has been shown that
a (0.5 + ε)-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game can be computed in time polynomial in the
input size and 1/ε2 [9].
Results. We develop a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for approximating Nash equilib-
rium in polymatrix games over trees under a mild renormalizing assumption on the players’
payoffs. Specifically, instead of normalizing the entries of each bimatrix game to lie in [0, 1],
which results in each player i’s payoff depending linearly on its degree, we normalize them to
lie in [0, 1/degree(i)], so that players’ total payoffs lie in [0, 1]. Our results actually extend even
under weaker renormalization conditions; see Section 2 for details. We show that, given an n-
player, m-action normalized polymatrix game over a tree, we can find an ε-Nash equilibrium
of the game in expected time
mO(
log m(log m+log n−log ε)
ε4
).
Our approach immediately implies a polynomial time approximation scheme for comput-
ing Nash equilibria when the number of actions per player is constant. The case of standard
bimatrix games can be trivially captured in our setting via a single-edge polymatrix game.
Further, for trees of constant degree our framework yields an algorithm that finds an ε-Nash
equilibrium in time mO(
log m+log n
ε2
). Note that in the single edge case (i.e., the case of standard
bimatrix games) this running-time bound matches the best known upper bound for approxi-
mating Nash equilibria [13].
Techniques. We develop a dynamic program to find an approximate Nash equilibrium of the
given tree polymatrix game. The idea is to root the underlying tree and process it in a bottom-
up manner. For each node/player p we maintain a set of mixed strategies—i.e., probability
distributions over player’s actions—that can be extended into a “partial” (approximate) equi-
librium of the subtree rooted at the node. That is, for each mixed strategy assigned to p there
exist mixed strategies for the descendants of p under which no descendant can benefit more
than ε, in expectation, by unilateral deviation. We find such extendable mixed strategies of a
player p after processing all of its children; in other words, we start from the leaves of the tree
2These hardness result hold for polynomially small ε.
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and move towards the root. Note that such an extendable mixed strategy for the root corre-
sponds to an approximate Nash equilibrium of the game. Also, it is worth pointing out that the
tree structure enables us to find partial equilibria of disjoint subtrees separately. In particular,
the fact that the utilities of players depend only on the actions of its parent and its children
implies that disjoint subtrees can be processed separately.
In and of itself, using a dynamic program to find an approximate Nash equilibrium over a
tree is a natural idea. In fact, similar approaches have been adopted in prior work; see, e.g., [10].
The key technical contribution in this paper is to show that the update step in the dynamic
program can be performed in quasi-polynomial time. To do this, we focus on a specific set of
mixed strategies U , which is the set of all uniform distributions with support size polynomial
in the approximation parameter ε and logarithmic in the number of players and the number
of actions; see Section 2 for a formal definition. It was shown in [1] that every multiplayer
game admits an ε-Nash equilibrium wherein the mixed strategy of each player is contained
in U . Hence, given an n-player game, an exhaustive search over the set Un is guaranteed to
find an approximate Nash equilibrium. But, such a search runs in time exponential in n. We
show that for tree polymatrix games, an exponential-time exhaustive search can be bypassed.
The idea is to follow the above mentioned dynamic program and consider, for each player p,
mixed strategies in the set U that can be extended into partial equilibria of the subtree rooted
at p. To perform the update step in the dynamic program we employ a linear program that,
interestingly, gives a tight characterization of mixed strategies that can be extended. Together,
these ideas lead us to a quasi-polynomial time approximation algorithm.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We study games with n players and m actions per player.3 Write [n] and [m] to denote the set
of players and the set of actions of each player, respectively. The utilities of the players are
normalized between 0 and 1; in particular, for each player p we have utility up : [m]
n → [0, 1].
Let ∆m be the set of probability distributions over [m]. In addition, for mixed strategy profile
x = (xq)q∈[n] ∈ ∆m × . . .×∆m, we denote the expected utility of player p by up(x). Following
standard notation, we use x−p to denote the mixed strategy profile of all players besides p.
Definition 1 (ε-Nash equilibirum). A mixed strategy profile x = (xq)q∈[n], where each xq ∈ ∆m,
is said to be an ε-Nash equilibrium iff for every player p ∈ [n] and action a ∈ [m] we have up(x) ≥
up(a, x−p)− ε.
Here, setting ε = 0 gives us the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
Polymatrix Games. In a polymatrix game, the players correspond to vertices of a graph
G = (V,E) and the utility of each player p ∈ V depends only on her action and the actions
of her neighbors. Moreover, the utility of each player is separable, i.e., for each edge (p, q) ∈
E we have a bimatrix game specified by m × m matrices Ap,q and Aq,p, and the utility of
player p, under action profile (aq)q∈[n] ∈ [m]n, is specified as follows up(a1, a2, . . . , an) :=∑
q:(p,q)∈E e
T
ap
Ap,q eaq . Here, ek ∈ Rm denotes the standard basis vector with 1 in the kth
component and 0’s elsewhere. Along these lines, for amixed strategy profile (xq)q∈[n] ∈ (∆m)n,
the expected utility of player p, up(x1, x2, . . . , xn) :=
∑
q:(p,q)∈E x
T
p Ap,qxq .
3We assume that each player has m actions for ease of presentation. The developed result directly extends to the
case wherein the number of actions of each player is different.
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As mentioned above, the utility of each player is normalized between 0 and 1. A typ-
ical way to accomplish this normalization (see, e.g., [9]) is to assume that for each player
p ∈ [n] the associated payoff matrices, Ap,qs, are entry-wise between 0 and 1, and the utility of
player p with degree d (in the graph) is obtained by dividing the sum of the payoffs by d, i.e.,
up(a1, a2, . . . , an) :=
1
d
∑
q:(p,q)∈E e
T
ap
Ap,q eaq . This normalization ensures that the same ap-
proximation guarantee is achieved for all players, irrespective of their degrees. If, instead, one
assumes that entry-wise the Ap,qs are between 0 and 1 and simply add the payoffs e
T
ai
Ap,qeaj ,
then the approximation guarantee for players with higher degree—since ε is the same of all the
players—is stronger. This would lead to an undesirable, nonuniform approximation bound.
The degree-normalized scaling mentioned above is equivalent to the assumption that for
player p ∈ [n], with degree d, thematricesAp,qs are contained in [0, 1/d]m×m and up(a1, . . . , an) :=∑
q:(p,q)∈E e
T
ap
Ap,q eaq . In this paper we in fact consider a more general setup in which, for
a player with degree d, entries of Ap,qs are between 0 and max
{
1
d
, ε
2
√
6d logm
}
. Here, again
we assume that for each action profile awe have ui(a) ∈ [0, 1]. Developing a quasi-polynomial
time algorithmwithout an entry-wise assumption (i.e., without requirement (i) in the following
definition) remains an interesting direction for future work.
Definition 2 (Normalized Polymatrix Game). Let G be an n-playerm-action polymatrix game over
graph G = (V,E) and with payoff matrices Ap,q and Aq,p, for (p, q) ∈ E. Given parameter ε, we
say that G is normalized iff for each player p ∈ [n] we have (i) the entries of Ap,qs are contained
in
[
0,max
{
1
d
, ε
2
√
6d logm
}]
; here d is the degree of player p in G, and (ii) for every action profile
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ [m]n, the utility up(a1, . . . , an) :=
∑
q:(p,q)∈E e
T
ap
Ap,q eaq is between 0 and 1.
Given mixed strategies of the neighbors of a player p, say (xq)q:(p,q)∈E , xp ∈ ∆m is said to
be an ε-best response of p against (xq)q:(p,q)∈E if p cannot benefit more than ε in expectation by
deviating from xp, i.e.,
∑
q:(p,q)∈E
xTpAp,qxq ≥ max
j∈[m]

 ∑
q:(p,q)∈E
eTj Ap,q xq

− ε. (1)
This paper studies polymatrix games in which the underlying graph G is a tree. Note that
a polymatrix game with exactly two players over a single edge (p, q) ∈ E—which is trivially
a tree—corresponds to a bimatrix game between players p and q. Hence, computation of an
approximate Nash equilibrium in tree polymatrix games is at least as hard as computation of
approximate Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games. Therefore, our running-time benchmark for
finding an ε-Nash equilibrium is quasi-polynomial: mO(
log m
ε2
), which is the best known upper
bound for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games [13].
Uniform Probability Distributions. A probability distribution x ∈ ∆m is said to be b
uniform if it is a uniform distribution over a size-bmultiset of [m]. Write U ⊂ ∆m to denote the
set of all
(
8(lnm+lnn−ln ε+ln 8)
ε2
)
-uniform probability distributions. Note that
|U | = mO( log m+log n−log εε2 ) (2)
As mentioned above, the work of Babichenko et al. [1] establishes that every n-player m-
action game admits an ε-Nash equilibrium x = (xq)q∈[n] such that xq ∈ U for all q ∈ [n]. Hence,
an exhaustive search over the set Un is guaranteed to find an ε-Nash equilibrium. Note that
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the running time of such a search ismO(
n(log m+log n−log ε)
ε2
), which is exponential in n. In contrast
to this exponential-time algorithm, we show that for tree polymatrix games an approximate
Nash equilibrium can be computed in expected time mO(
log m(log m+log n−log ε)
ε4
), which is quasi-
polynomial in n andm.
Next we state McDiarmid’s inequality [14]. We use this concentration bound to prove our main
result.
McDiarmid Inequality. Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zd ∈ Z be independent random variables and f : Zd → R
be a function of Z1, Z2, . . . , Zd. If for all i ∈ [d] and for all z1, z2, . . . , zd, z′i ∈ Z the function f satisfies
|f(z1, . . . , zi, . . . , zd)− f(zi, . . . , z′i, . . . , zd)| ≤ ci,
then for δ > 0,
Pr(|f − E[f ]| ≥ δ) ≤ 2 exp
(
−2δ2∑d
i=1 c
2
i
)
.
3 Quasi-Polynomial Time Algorithm
This section develops the dynamic program that finds an approximate Nash equilibrium. We
will consider G to be a rooted tree and process it in a bottom-up manner. We start with players
all whose descendants are leaves, and then iteratively proceed onto the remaining players.
Write C(q) and D(q) to denote the set of children and the set of descendants of player q,
respectively. The iterative process maintains a set Up,q(z) for each parent-child pair (p, q) ∈ E
and each z ∈ U .4 Intuitively, Up,q(z) denotes the set of mixed strategies for player q that can
be extended into a “partial” ε-Nash equilibrium of the subtree rooted at q. Here p, the parent
of q, is playing mixed strategy z and might not be best responding. Formally, the inductive
definition of the sets Up,q(z)s is as follows:
• If q is a leaf player (i.e., q corresponds to a leaf in tree G), then Up,q(z) := {y ∈ U | y is an
ε-best response of q against z}.
• Else, if q is a not a leaf player, we define Up,q(z) := {y ∈ U | there exist mixed strategies
(xc)c∈C(q) ∈
∏
c∈C(q) Uq,c(y) such that y is an ε-best response of q against (xc)c∈C(q) and
z}; here, mixed strategy z is associated with parent player p.
We also define the set Ur for the root r of tree G: Ur := {y ∈ U | there exist mixed strategies
(xc)c∈C(r) ∈
∏
c∈C(r) Ur,c(y) such that y is an ε-best response of r against (xc)c∈C(r)}.
If y ∈ Up,q(z) and q is not a leaf, then, by the above definition, there exist mixed strategy
profiles (xc)c∈C(q) ∈
∏
c∈C(q) Uq,c(y) such that y is an ε-best response of q against (xc)c∈C(q) and
z. We will use Ep,q(z, y) to denote such a collection of mixed strategies, (xc)c∈C(q).
Along these lines, for the root r of the tree G we define Er(y), for each y ∈ Ur, to be a
collection of mixed strategies (xc)c∈C(r) ∈
∏
c∈C(r) Ur,c(y) such that y is an ε-best response of r
against (xc)c∈C(r).
Note that mixed strategies in Ep,q(z, y) extend y into a “partial” ε-Nash equilibrium of the
subtree rooted at q. Specifically, we can inductively use Ep,q(z, y), then Eq,c(y, xc), for each
c ∈ C(q), and so on, to determinemixed strategies (xs)s∈D(q) for each descendant s ∈ D(q) such
4Recall that U is the set of all O
(
logm+log n−log ε
ε
2
)
-uniform probability distributions.
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that no player in the subtree rooted at q can benefit more than ε, in expectation, by deviating
unilaterally. Here we do not assert that the parent player p is at an approximate equilibrium.
In addition, note that the utilities of all the players s ∈ D(q) ∪ {q} depend only on the mixed
strategies of players in D(q) ∪ {p, q} and, hence, these utilities can be determined even if the
mixed strategies of players in [n] \ (D(q) ∪ {p, q}) are unspecified.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for finding ε-Nash equilibrium in tree polymatrix games
Given: A normalized polymatrix game over tree G = (V,E). Return: An ε-Nash equilibrium of
the game.
1: Initialize processed set P to be the leaves in G and all Up,q(z) = ∅
2: while V \ P 6= φ do
3: Select p ∈ V \ P such that C(p) ⊆ P
4: for all q ∈ C(p) and z ∈ U do
5: for all y ∈ U do
6: if q is a leaf node and y is an ε-best response of q against z then
7: Update Up,q(z)← Up,q(z) ∪ {y}
8: else if there exist mixed strategy profiles (xc)c∈C(q) ∈
∏
c∈C(q) Uq,c(y) such that y is an
ε-best response against (xc)c∈C(q) and z then
9: Update Up,q(z) ← Up,q(z) ∪ {y} and set Ep,q(z, y) ← (xc)c∈C(q) {There could be mul-
tiple tuples (xc)c∈C(q) that satisfy this best-response condition. We set Ep,q(z, y) to be
any one of them.}
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: P ← P ∪ {p}
14: end while
15: For the root r of the tree G, initialize Ur = φ.
16: for all y ∈ U do
17: if there exist mixed strategy profiles (xc)c∈C(r) ∈
∏
c∈C(r) Ur,c(y) such that y is an ε-best
response against (xc)c∈C(r) then
18: Update Ur ← Ur ∪ {y} and set Er(y) = (xc)c∈C(r). Use Lemma 1 to find an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the game
19: end if
20: end for
Following the definition ofUp,q(z), Algorithm 1 constructs these sets and extensionsEp,q(z, y)
for all parent-child pairs (p, q) ∈ E and z ∈ U in a bottom-upmanner. At the end, the algorithm
uses the set Ur defined for the root r to find an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game. Overall, the
applicability of the sets Up,q and Ep,q is established in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. Let G be a polymatrix game over a tree G = (V,E). Given sets Up,q(z)—for each parent-
child pair (p, q) ∈ E—and mixed strategy collections Ep,q(z, y)—for y ∈ Up,q(z)—along with a mixed
strategy profile yˆ ∈ Ur and associated collection Er(yˆ) for the root r, we can find an ε-Nash equilibrium
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of the game G in time polynomial in |U |.
Proof. The lemma is implied directly by the underlying definitions. For each parent-child pair
(p, q) ∈ E there exists at least one set Up,q which is nonempty: as mentioned above, every n-
player m-action game admits an ε-Nash equilibrium (xˆq)q∈[n] where each xˆq ∈ U . Hence, in
particular, xˆq ∈ Up,q(xˆp). Moreover, we have xˆr ∈ Ur.
In fact to find an ε-Nash equilibrium we can start with the given mixed strategy profile
xr = yˆ then, for each c ∈ C(r), pick the corresponding mixed strategy xc in Er(xr). The
definition of Er(xr) implies that xc can be extended to obtain an ε-Nash equilibrium of the
subtree rooted at c. We can in fact find such an ε-Nash equilibrium by proceeding inductively
down the tree; in particular, by setting xs for s ∈ C(c) to be the strategy associated with s in
Er,c(xr , xc)). The definitions of Ep,qs ensure that this inductive process will run to completion
and find an ε-Nash equilibrium of the subtree rooted at c. By repeating the process for each
c ∈ C(r) we will find a mixed strategy xp for each player p ∈ [n]. Furthermore, the definitions
of the underlying sets also imply that the found mixed strategy profile (xp)p∈[n] is an ε-Nash
equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 tests whether y ∈ Up,q(z) (i.e., tests whether there exist mixed strategy profiles
(xc)c∈C(q) ∈
∏
c∈C(q) Uq,c(y) such that y is an ε-best response of q against (xc)c∈C(q) and z) in
Step 8, and the same idea is employed in Step 17. In particular, if the number of children of q is
Ω
(
logm
ε2
)
then Algorithm 1 uses the following linear-programming relaxation LP(p, q, z, y) to
perform this test. The other case, wherein |C(q)| = o
(
logm
ε2
)
, is addressed directly via exhaus-
tive search, see proof of Theorem 1 for details.
max
αx,σc
0
subject to
∑
x∈Uq,c(y)
αx = 1 ∀c ∈ C(q)
σc =
∑
x∈Uq,c(y)
αx x ∀c ∈ C(q)
yTAq,pz +
∑
c∈C(q)
yTAq,c σc ≥ eTj Aq,pz +
∑
c∈C(q)
eTj Aq,c σc −
ε
2
∀j ∈ [m] (3)
αx ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ ∪c∈C(q) Uq,c(y)
σc ∈ ∆m ∀c ∈ C(q).
Formally, Lemma 2 below establishes that the feasibility of the linear program LP(p, q, z, y)
implies the required containment y ∈ Up,q(z), when |C(q)| = Ω
(
logm
ε2
)
. Note that LP(p, q, z, y)
is parameterized by players p and q alongwith mixed strategies z and y. In addition, inequality
(3) in LP(p, q, z, y) enforces that y is an ε/2-best response against σcs and z. Also, if for some
player c ∈ C(q) the set Uq,c(y) is empty, then LP(p, q, z, y) is trivially infeasible.
Lemma 2. Let player p be the parent of player q in a normalized polymatrix game over rooted tree
G = (V,E). Also, let the number of children of q, |C(q)| = Ω
(
logm
ε2
)
. Then, the feasibility of the
linear program LP(p, q, z, y), for mixed strategies z, y ∈ U , implies that y ∈ Up,q(z). Moreover, using a
feasible solution of LP(p, q, z, y) we can find mixed strategy profiles Ep,q(z, y) via a sampling algorithm
whose expected running time is polynomial in |U |.
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Proof. Scalars (αx)x∈Uq,c(y) are nonnegative and sum up to one; hence, they induce a probabil-
ity distribution over Uq,c(y), for c ∈ C(q). Write αc to denote this distribution. Also, let χc be
the random variable that is equal to mixed strategy x ∈ Uq,c(y) with probability αx, i.e., χc is
drawn from αc. Note that Eαc [χc] = σc.
Let d denote the number of children of q, d := |C(q)|. For fixed j ∈ [m], we consider function
fj(χ1, . . . , χd) :=
∑
c∈C(q) e
T
j Aq,cχc. The expected value of the function satisfies Eα1,...,αd [fj] =∑
c∈C(q) e
T
j Aq,c σc.
Given that the underlying game is normalized (see Definition 2) and d = Ω
(
logm
ε2
)
, each
entry of Aq,c is between 0 and
ε
2
√
6d logm
.
This entry-wise bound implies that for any c ∈ C(q) and χ1, .., χc, .., χd, χ′c ∈ U the following
Lipscihtz condition holds for fj :
|fj(χ1, . . . , χc, . . . , χd)− fj(χ1, . . . , χ′c, . . . , χd)| ≤
ε
2
√
6d logm
.
Using McDiarmid’s inequality (see Section 2) we get that
Pr
α1,...,αd
(|fj − E[fj ]| ≥ ε/4) ≤ 2
m3
.
Say, E denotes the event that for all j ∈ [m], we have |fj − E[fj ]| ≤ ε/4. Using the union
bound we get that Prα1,..,αd(E) ≥ 1 − 2/m2. Therefore, the probabilistic method guarantees
the existence of mixed strategies xc ∈ Uq,c(y), for c ∈ C(q), that satisfy E . Note that to obtain
such a collection of mixed strategies the expected number of times that we need to sample—the
product distribution
∏
c∈C(q) α
c—is at most two.
Say that mixed strategies xc ∈ Uq,c(y), for c ∈ C(q), satisfy event E . Next we will show that
y is an ε-best response of q against (xc)c∈C(q), and z. Overall, this implies that y ∈ Up,q(z), and
we can set Ep,q(z, y) = (xc)c∈C(q).
Mixed strategies xcs satisfy |fj(x1, . . . , xd)− E[fj ]| ≤ ε/4 for all j ∈ [m]. That is,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈C(d)
eTj Aq,c xc −
∑
c∈C(q)
eTj Aq,c σc
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
ε
4
∀j ∈ [m]. (4)
Using inequality (4) for each j in the support of distribution y ∈ ∆m, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈C(d)
yTAq,c xc −
∑
c∈C(q)
yTAq,c σc
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
ε
4
. (5)
Note that y satisfies inequality (3) in the linear program, i.e., y is an ε/2-best response
against σcs and z. Using inequalities (4) and (5) to bound the change in the left-hand-side
of (3) and the right-hand-side of (3) respectively, we get that y is an ε-best response against xcs
and z:
yTAq,pz +
∑
c∈C(q)
yTAq,c xc ≥ eTj Aq,pz +
∑
c∈C(q)
eTj Aq,c xc − ε ∀j ∈ [m]
Therefore, if LP(p, q, z, y) is feasible then y ∈ Up,q(z). Also, note that the size of LP(p, q, z, y)
is at most O(nm|U |), therefore we can solve the linear program in time polynomial in |U |. As
mentioned above, given a feasible solution of LP(p, q, z, y), to obtain Ep,q(y, z) (i.e., a collection
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of mixed strategies (xc)c∈C(q) that satisfy E) the expected number of times that we need to
sample is at most two. This establishes the running time bound stated in the lemma, and we
get the desired claims.
Next we prove the main result.
Theorem 1. Given an n-playerm-action normalized polymatrix game over a tree, Algorithm 1 deter-
mines an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game in expected time
mO(
log m(log m+log n−log ε)
ε4
).
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be the underlying tree of the given normalized polymatrix game. First,
we will prove that Algorithm 1 necessarily finds a mixed strategy in Ur, for the root r of G, in
the specified amount of time. Hence, via lemma 1, we get that Algorithm 1 successfully finds
an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game.
As mentioned above, it was established in [1] that every n-playerm-action game admits an
ε/2-Nash equilibrium (xˆq)q∈[n] where each xˆq ∈ U .5 Hence, for each parent-child pair (p, q) ∈
E there exists at least one set Up,q which is nonempty; in particular, xˆq ∈ Up,q(xˆp). Moreover,
for z = xˆp and y = xˆq the relaxation LP(p, q, z, y) is guaranteed to be feasible. Therefore,
contingent on the fact that the “if” condition in Step 8 and 17 is performed correctly, we get
that Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to move up the tree with non-empty Up,qs and, finally, find a
mixed strategy in Ur.
Specifically, the correctness of the “if” condition (which we establish below) ensures that
for an ε/2-Nash equilibrium (xˆp)p∈[n] and the sets Up,qs populated by the algorithm we have
xˆq ∈ Up,q(xˆp) for every parent-child pair (p, q) ∈ E. This follows via an inductive argument
over levels of the tree: if q is a leaf node then xˆq is an ε best response against xˆp and we
get the desired containment xˆq ∈ Up,q(xˆp). Furthermore, using the induction hypothesis that
xˆc ∈ Uq,c(xˆq) for all c ∈ C(q), we get that the “if” condition in Step 8 will be satisfied for xˆq
and xˆp, i.e., the algorithm will include xˆq in Up,q(xˆp) and the inductive claim holds. In par-
ticular, this observation implies that the algorithm will never encounter the situation wherein
the set Up,q(x) is remain empty for all x ∈ U after the for loops, i.e., the algorithm will always
run to completion. It is also relevant to note that the algorithm can set Ep,q(xˆq, xˆp) to be any
tuple (xc)c∈C(q) that satisfies satisfies the best response condition for xˆq and xˆp. That is, it is
not necessary that the algorithm sets Ep,q(xˆq , xˆp) = (xˆc)c∈C(q). But still, the above mentioned
argument goes though and we get that the algorithm always runs to completion.
The “if” condition in Step 8 and 17 is performedO(n|U |2) times. Next we show that the “if”
condition is verified correctly in expected time |U |O( log mε2 ). This overall establishes the stated
claims.
If the number of children of a player q is o
(
logm
ε2
)
then we can go over the entire set∏
c∈C(q) Uq,c(y) in time |U |o(
log m
ε2
) and determine whether the “if” condition in Step 8 is sat-
isfied. The same argument works in Step 17, if the number of children of the root r is o
(
logm
ε2
)
.
For the remainder of the proof we consider the other case wherein the number of children
of q (or the root r) is Ω
(
logm
ε2
)
. In this case we verify the “if” condition in Step 8 (and Step 17)
by solving the linear-programming relaxation LP(p, q, z, y) and employing Lemma 2. Note the
the size of LP(p, q, z, y) is O(n|U |) and hence (again, via Lemma 2) in expected time polynomial
5The change from ε-Nash equilibrium to ε/2-Nash equilibrium can be easily addressed by adjusting the size of U .
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in |U |we can test if y ∈ Up,q(z) and find Ep,q(z, y). Recall that this test is guaranteed to succeed
for the ε/2-Nash equilibrium (xˆq)q∈[n], since the corresponding LP(p, q, z, y)s will be feasible.
Hence, we get that Algorithm 1 proceeds up the tree with xˆqs, and eventually after processing
the root r finds an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game.
Steps 8 and 17 are executed O(n|U |2) times, and the expected running time of these steps
is |U |O( log mε2 ). These observations establish the time complexity of the algorithm and complete
the proof.
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